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Republican advantages in candidate recruitment in 2010 have
led to an increasingly polarized House of Representatives.
In 2010, the Republican Party regained the House of Representatives, gaining 63 seats from
the Democrats. Jamie L. Carson and Stephen Pettigrew take a close look at what fueled
this near unprecedented gain, as well as Republican victories in the Senate. They argue that
rising unemployment, President Obama’s declining approval ratings across the board, and the
Republican ability to field many more candidates with previous electoral experiences were all
factors in the Democrats’ significant defeat. They write that one of the consequences of the
2010 result was a much more politically polarized Congress, something that is still very much
the case in 2013.
The 2010 midterms will likely go down as one of  the most historic elections in the modern
era. With the biggest turnover at the midterm f or either party since 1938, Republicans
regained control of  the U.S. House of  Representatives, f ollowing f our years of  Democratic
leadership. Af ter enjoying a near- f ilibuster proof  majority, Democrats’ share in the Senate
was reduced to just 53 seats. Additionally, the election showcased the burgeoning Tea
Party, a conservative grassroots movement with a distinct anti-Washington, anti- incumbent
f lavor. But what inf luenced this result, and what have been the consequences f or Congress?
Much of  the f ocus of  congressional campaigns in 2010 was on the unemployment rate and job creation.
Just as the f inancial meltdown and economic downturn were the key issues in the 2008 presidential race,
conditions had not improved by early 2010. Figure 1 shows the national unemployment rate f rom the
beginning of  2008 to November 2010. When Obama took of f ice in January of  2009 the unemployment rate
was at 8.5 per cent. One year later it had grown to 10.6 per cent. The f igure slightly dropped in 2010 to 9 per
cent, but with such a high number of  Americans without jobs, this became the top polit ical issue f or
Republicans. Considerable debate ensued over whether President Obama or f ormer President Bush should
properly receive blame f or the poor economic conditions. Although increases in unemployment during the
f irst couple months of  his term could not be blamed on Obama, by 2010 it became more dif f icult f or the
Democrats to pin the blame on the policies of  President Bush.
Figure 1 – National unemployment rate 2008 – 2010
During the f irst two years of  the Obama Presidency, two important pieces of  legislation were enacted—the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the stimulus) and the Patient and Protection and Af f ordable
Care Act (Obamacare).  Although both were key accomplishments f or the Administration, they were not
without controversy. The polit ical consequences of  these domestic policies, as well as the perpetually high
unemployment rate, can be seen in Obama’s approval rating. Figure 2 shows the steady decline in approval
f or President Obama between his inauguration in 2009 and the midterm elections in 2010. The middle line
represents a smoothed average f or his approval rating. The top and bottom lines map approval ratings f or
Obama among Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Approval steadily declined during Obama’s f irst
two years in of f ice. At the time of  his inauguration, his overall approval was about 65 per cent, but by
October 2010 it had diminished to around 45 per cent. Democrats began Obama’s term approving of  the
president at a rate of  about 90 per cent and declined to 80 per cent by the midterm elections. For
Republicans, however, the f igure began at 40 per cent but quickly dropped and spent most of  late 2010
hovering around 10 per cent.
Figure 2 – Approval ratings for President Obama 2009 – 2010
Source: Gallup. 
It should not come as a surprise that Republicans in 2010 had more success at candidate recruitment than
Democrats. In terms of  overall recruitment, the Republican Party was able to f ield a candidate in all but f ive
House elections in 2010, something truly unprecedented. Democrats, on the other hand, lef t 24
Republicans running uncontested. The gap between the parties is even more apparent when one takes into
account the backgrounds of  the candidates being recruited. Republicans entered the November election
with 77 challengers who had previous elective experience, compared to just 46 f or the Democrats. This gap
was even more substantial in races f eaturing an incumbent. The GOP recruited almost twice the number of
quality challengers to f ace incumbents than did the Democrats.
The recruit ing gap between the two parties is more stark when put into historical context. Figure 3 shows
the dif f erence in the number of  quality candidates recruited f or each party since 1946. Data points that lie
above zero represent a Republican advantage, and points below zero represent a Democratic advantage.
The graph demonstrates the historical signif icance of  the Republican recruit ing advantage in 2010. Having
32 more quality candidates on the ballot than the Democrats represents the largest Republican advantage
since 1946, one more than the 1966 midterm elections. The Republican advantage in 2010 is also the sixth
largest gap in f avor of  either party since the end of  World War II. 
Figure 3 – Republican advantage in candidate recruitment in the modern era
Source: The data for this graph and all other discussions of previous congressional
elections were graciously shared by Gary Jacobson.
In the modern era, incumbents tend to win at overwhelmingly high rates.  Despite the historic nature of  the
2010 elections, this was still true to a limited extent.  Of  all the incumbent members of  the House that
sought reelection in 2010, 85 per cent of  them won their race. Omitt ing the cases of  unopposed
incumbents, the vote proportion f or incumbents is normally distributed around the mean of  about 63 per
cent. Yet just because the average incumbent vote was over 60 per cent, this does not mean that it was
smooth sailing f or all incumbents in 2010. Indeed there were 54 incumbents seeking reelection that were
def eated in the general election. Two of  these incumbents were Republicans; the remaining 52 were
Democrats.
Figure 4 below places these high incumbent def eat numbers in a historical context. The bar graph
demonstrates that 54 def eated incumbents is the largest such value since 1948. The 52 Democrats who
were def eated is the largest number since at least 1946. This graph makes the Democratic waves of  2006
and 2008 look like nothing more than ripples; the combined number of  def eated Republican incumbents in
these elections is still less than the number of  def eated Democrats in 2010. One possible explanation f or
this trend against Democratic incumbents could be that voters were holding members accountable f or
controversial roll-call votes. Almost every def eated incumbent (48) voted in f avor of  the stimulus package,
and a majority (35) voted f or healthcare ref orm. Of  the 34 Democrats who voted no on healthcare ref orm,
13 were reelected, 7 lost in the general election, 2 sought higher of f ice, and 2 retired. 
Figure 4 – Incumbents defeated in House elections, 1946 – 2010
One immediate and important consequence of  the 2010 midterm elections was that it f urther increased the
level of  polarization between the parties in Congress.  Figure 5 shows the rif t between the ideal points of
the two parties, as measured by DW-NOMINATE scores. As a result of  moderate Democratic incumbents
losing in the 2010 elections, the mean Democratic ideology (shown in blue) moved to the lef t. Republicans
(shown in red), however, were not expected to become more moderate. If  campaign messages are any
indication, Republican f reshmen were expected to be much more extreme in their ideological posit ion than
were Democratic f reshman in either 2006 or 2008. The direct result of  this polarization was more partisan
gridlock with respect to legislation; Republicans sought to def und aspects of  Obama’s healthcare ref orm
package and signif icant battles were f ought over the f ederal budget and government debt ceiling. This
partisan polarization has extended into the 113th Congress as well. 
Figure 5: Polarization in Congress 2009 – 2011
Perhaps the strongest message that 2010 midterms f or those who f ollow elections was that idiosyncratic
f actors can still have a strong inf luence on congressional races.
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